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ABSTRACT 
Integrity of Real Time Kinematic (RTK) positioning solutions relates to the confidential level that can be 
placed in the information provided by the RTK system. It includes the ability of the RTK system to 
provide timely valid warnings to users when the system must not be used for the intended operation. For 
instance, in the controlled traffic farming (CTF) system that controls traffic separate wheel beds and root 
beds, RTK positioning error causes overlap and increases the amount of soil compaction. The RTK 
system’s integrity capacity can inform users when the actual positional errors of the RTK solutions have 
exceeded Horizontal Protection Levels (HPL) within a certain Time-To-Alert (TTA) at a given Integrity 
Risk (IR). The later is defined as the probability that the system claims its normal operational status while 
actually being in an abnormal status, for instance, the ambiguities being incorrectly fixed and positional 
errors having exceeded the HPL. The paper studies the required positioning performance (RPP) of the 
GPS positioning system for PA applications such as a CTF system, according to literature reviews and 
surveys conducted among a number of farming companies. The HPL and IR are derived from these RPP 
parameters. A RTK-specific rover autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) algorithm is developed to 
determine the system integrity according to real time outputs, such as residual square sum (RSS), HDOP 
values. A two-station baseline data set is analysed to demonstrate the concept of RTK integrity and assess 
the RTK solution continuity, missed detection and false alarm probability. 
Introduction 
In recent years, precision agriculture (PA) has evolved into a hot research and commercial topic all over 
the world and changed the traditional farming dramatically. As defined by (NRC 1997), “Precision 
agriculture is a management strategy that uses information technology to bring data from multiple sources 
to bear on decisions associated with crop production”(Pierce & Nowak, 1999b). More specifically, PA 
enables real-time data collection with sufficiently accurate positioning information being used for 
enhancement of agricultural production such as soil sampling, tractor guidance, crop scouting, yield 
monitoring and variable rate applications by means of the combination of Global Positioning System 
(GPS) and Geographic Information System (GIS). GPS/GIS helps the customers analyse the data 
efficiently and make a farming plan correctly(Pierce & Nowak, 1999a). The benefits of PA include not 
only increasing productivity and net profit, improving water quality and wildlife habitat, saving valuable 
time, fuel and fertilizer, but also significantly reducing the farmers fatigue and stress by providing better 
decision making ability(Reid, Zhang, & Noguchi, 2000). More important, PA contributes to sustainable 
use of natural resources for generations to come as reducing the negative farming impacts on the 
environment. (Cook & Bramley, 1998) It is not difficult to understand the importance of Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) as the fundamental enabling technological element of PA. In the 
last two decades there have been seen a tremendous development and growth in the use of GNSS in PA, 
especially using Real Time Kinematic (RTK) technique. RTK is a sort of advanced differential GPS 
(DGPS), but using carrier phase as the measurements. RTK positioning requires a nearby, stationary 
reference station or network which can sent the data to the user’s system, usually called the rover by a 
radio link. The key issue of RTK is called ambiguity resolution (AR) problem, which aims to determine 
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the parameter of unknown carrier phase number. After the ambiguity fixed, the RTK solutions can 
provide centimetre accuracy which allows us applying in the application of automatic steering systems. A 
typical and successful case of applications is so-called Controlled Traffic Farming (CTF) in which the 
2cm RMS positioning accuracy is preferred to reduce the potential for skips or overlaps and enables the 
farmers to seed, spray or fertilize only where they are needed—minimizing application costs and 
increasing productivity (see Fig. 1).  Additionally, as the result of the high accuracy positioning, the CTF 
system can be also used to do the topography mapping whilst performing normal farming operations in 
the future (Tullberg, Yule, & McGarry, 2007) 
    
Figure 1: Comparison of the Steering Results by CTF and Random traffic (Newsletter, 2009) 
However, the accuracy is the simplest and most commonly used performance requirement for navigation 
or kinematic positioning system, but definitely not the only one. In PA, the farmers have to rely on the 
output of GNSS to make the decision of where to seed, water, spray and fertilize assuming it is correct. 
Unfortunately, the accuracy and reliability of the real time position outputs can be degraded due to 
various factors, such as effects of operational environment, multipath, RTCM message delays, GPS signal 
transmission anomaly and the system’s vulnerable performance. What the worse news is that 
“mismanagement and a lack of investment means that some of the crucial GPS satellites could begin to 
fail as early as next year (2010)” according to the report of the US government accountability office 
(GAO) (Bobbie Johnson, 2009). That could mean that some unreliable GPS satellites would have to keep 
operating. Therefore, we need more than ever to devise a technique to detect any possible failures and 
warn the user using the potentially misleading navigation information. This is so-called integrity 
requirement, a measure of the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by 
the total system, as defined as in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (S. Feng & 
Ochieng, 2007a). Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely and valid warnings to users, 
know as alerts, when the system must not be used for the intended operation. One of the most efficient 
and popular tool to address this problem is Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) technique 
as described in (Brown, 1988; Y. C. Lee, 1986;Feng et al 2009; Hewitson & Wang, 2006; Todd Walter, 
2003) This rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the status of RTK application 
in PA and the different accuracy requirement, also gives the corresponding CTF integrity requirement. 
Section 3 briefly describes the method of snapshot RAIM, including the test statistic and calculation of 
the Horizontal Protection Level (HPL). In Section 4, the experimental studies are performed based on real 
GPS baseline to demonstrate the results of different situation. Finally the conclusions are presented in 
Section 5. 
The Status of RTK Application in Precision Agriculture   
The components of PA include: GPS; GIS; Grid sampling; Variable rate technology; Yield monitors; 
Yield mapping; Remote sensors; Auto-guidance; Proximate sensors and Computer hardware and 
software(Srinivasan, 2006). As the fundamental element of PA technology, GNSS plays a pivotal role for 
agricultural vehicle guidance such as CTF. Generally, we can evaluate the performance of CTF system in 
terms of the four required positioning performance (RPP) parameters: accuracy, integrity, continuity and 
availability. The more details about the four parameters can be referred to the literatures regarding GPS 
aviation navigation, such as (Brown, 1996; S. Feng & Ochieng, 2007b; Ober, 2003; Rtca, 2001; Sturza, 
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1988) As far as the RTK accuracy and integrity performance characteristics are concerned, this paper 
refers to (Y. Feng & Wang, 2008)for definition. 
The Accuracy Requirement for PA 
It is not wrong to pursue the highest level of accuracy for the sake of academic and scientific causes. 
However, this pursuit does not apply in the commercial are, where the higher the accuracy, the higher the 
cost. For instance, it is not wise to buy a $3,000 sub-meter DGPS receiver for personal route guidance 
applications if the same function can be achieved with only a $99 GPS. The important thing is to make 
correct decision based on the accuracy requirements of diverse farming operations. 
 
According to surveys and literature reviews some researchers classify farming operations in to rough (soil 
sampling, weed scouting), fine (pesticide application, soil cultivation), and precise (planting, plowing) 
navigation categories and give the conservative requirements for each of the navigation categories as 1m, 
10cm and 1cm (Auernhammer & Muhr, 1991; McLellan & Friesen, 1996; Nieminen, Mononen, & Sampo, 
1994). Table 1 gives a summary of various positioning techniques/services, costs and accuracy 
requirements and their suitability for different agriculture applications.  
Table 1 GPS Positioning Methods Versus PA Accuracy Requirements 
Positioning Method Option Cost Uses in Agriculture 
Standard Positioning Meters $80-300 Rough positioning, 
Scouting (50-100m) 
WAAS/EGNOS, Beacon, 
OmniSTAR VBS 
Sub-meter $1k-4k Yield mapping(2-5m), 
Pre-tilling (1-2m) 
OmniSTAR XP/HP, 
Local  DGPS 
Decimetre $5k-10k Automated machine guidance (10-20cm), 
Yield mapping(0.5-2m), 
GIS surveys (0.5-2m), 
Soil sampling (horizontal:5-10cm; vertical:5-
50 cm), 
RTK, Network RTK Centimetre >$25k Automatic steering (2cm); 
Planting (5cm); 
Spraying-twice (5cm); 
Cultivation- twice(5cm); 
Harvesting (5cm); Seeding (2-20cm); 
 
Although a CTF system is a very expensive positioning system, it has the highest level of accuracy (2 to 5 
cm) which can bring many benefits to customers (Yule, 1998). The problem is that no RTK system can 
be guaranteed to provide such level of accuracy at all times. In this case, the users need to know whether 
the system work properly, otherwise some safety or unexpected liability issues will occur. Due to these 
problems, the need for an effective method for monitoring GPS integrity is required.  
The Integrity Requirement for PA 
Integrity requirements for positioning in PA are twofold: machinery safety and PA operation liability. It is 
reported that machinery related accidents to account for 10 percent of 200,000 farm accidents in 1993 in 
the USA with a couple of injuries being fatal(Murphy & Morrow, 1996).Hence, to avoid injuries and to 
warrant machine function, operation performance and the prevention of accidents, adequate safety has 
been a demand for autonomous agricultural vehicles(Jahns, 1975). Taking into account the physical 
necessity of proximity between harvester and truck, for example, unreliable auto-guided harvester would 
involve a prohibitive potential risk of accident if it loses control and rushes against the truck. Therefore, 
auto-guided systems must always behave safely and a serious means of evaluating their performance is 
highly recommended. The liability refers to the level of cost, due to inappropriate operation, and the side-
effect, such as to environment.   
 
In these applications, it is essential that farmers be assured that a system is operating within design 
tolerances and that the position estimates derive from it can be trusted to be within specifications. System 
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Integrity is the ability of the system to provide timely warnings to users when it should not be used for 
operation. To specify the integrity concept, there are three parameters involved: horizontal alert limit 
(HAL), time-to-alert (TTA), and integrity risk (IR) (S. Feng & Ochieng, 2007a). More specifically, HAL 
is the maximum horizontal position error allowable for a given navigation/positioning mode (e.g., en 
route, nonprecision approach) without an alert; TTA is the maximum allowable elapsed time from the 
onset of a positioning failure until the equipment annunciate the alert (Kalafus & Chin, 1988). IR is the 
probability that the navigation positioning error exceeds the alert limit and the event is not detected (Y. 
Lee, Van Dyke, DeCleene, Studenny, & Beckmann, 1996). 
 
Based on the required navigation parameter (RNP) given by ICAO, we can extend the concepts into the 
PA applications. The accuracy requirement is 2- dimensional horizontal RMS circle around the true 
position; in other words it means the position error is within the accuracy requirement should be 95% of 
time. The alert limit for integrity is the positioning accuracy of 99.7% which is probably about 3 times of 
the accuracy specification. In terms of other parameters, the mediate reference values are adopted in this 
paper (S. Feng & Ochieng, 2007a). Table 2 gives an example of the RPP for precision agriculture.  
Table 2. Example RPP for Precision Agriculture 
Mode 
of  
Manipulation 
Horizontal    
Accuracy 
Integrity Continuity Availability 
Horizontal 
Alert Limit 
Integrity 
Risk 
Time to 
Alert 
Yield mapping 1m 2.5m 10-6/h 15 sec 10-5/h 0.997 
Automated 
machine 
guidance 
20cm 0.5m 10-6/h 10 sec 10-5/h 0.997 
Spraying twice 5cm 0.15m 10-6/h 5 sec 10-5/h 0.997 
CTF 2cm 6cm 10-6/h 5 sec 10-5/h 0.997 
Modified snapshot RAIM method in RTK positioning 
The idea of the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) as firstly proposed by (Grover Brown, 
1992)was detects faults with redundant GPS pseudorange measurements. That is, when more satellites are 
available than needed to produce a position fix, the extra pseudoranges should all be consistent with the 
computed position. A pseudorange that differs significantly from the expected value may indicate a fault 
of the associated satellite or another signal integrity problem. The test statistic used is a function of the 
pseudorange measurement residual (the difference between the expected measurement and the observed 
measurement) and the amount of redundancy. The test statistic is compared with a threshold value, which 
is determined based on the requirements for the probability of false alarm (PFA) and the probability of 
missed detection (PMD). 
 
In the RTK positioning, the double differenced (DD) pseudorange and carrier phase measurements are 
used instead of un-differenced pseudorange measurements, involving ambiguity resolution (AR) and 
position estimation, thus the RAIM problem become more complicated. The existing RAIM algorithms 
detect DD phase outliers in  snapshot solutions or filtering solutions, such as in (S. Feng & Ochieng, 2006; 
Hewitson & Wang, 2007; Kovach, Maquet, & Davis, 1995). In the following, the prior ambiguity 
solutions are used along with the current measurements, referring to Chang (Chang et al, 2001), where the 
model was called the double difference prior information model. From integrity determination perspective, 
it is a modified snapshot method, but considering the previous ambiguity solutions.  
Basic Equations 
With two dual-frequency GPS receivers, one can form two double differenced (DD) carrier phase and 
code observation equations, respectively: 
1 1 1 12
1
I N
f 
                             (1) 
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2
I N
f 
              (2) 
1 12
1
P
IP
f
                          (3) 
2 22
2
P
IP
f
             (4) 
In (1) to (4), the symbol “∆” represents double difference operations between satellites and 
receivers; 1 ,and 2  are phase signals on L1 and L2 frequencies, ∆P1 and ∆P2 are code 
measurements on L1 and L2 carriers; the symbol ∆ is the geometric distance between satellite and 
receiver antenna; 2
1
I
f

and 2
2
I
f

are the ionospheric propagation errors with respect to L1 and L2 carriers 
respectively.For a two-receivers baseline, one can form the geometry-based observational equations 
directly for the 1 ,and 2  observables. 
 
Feng (2008) suggested use of the optimally combined virtual phase code measurements instead of 
original signals for more efficient geometry-based AR, based on the minimal total noise level in cycles, 
which actually reduce the correlation between selected combined DD measurements. For instance, the 
combined code observable is less noisy over a medium baseline over which the magnitude of code noise 
may be larger than the effect of ionosphere: 
 1 1 2 212
1 2
f P f PP
f f
           (5) 
 One can use the widelane phase measurement  
 1 1 2 212
1 2
f f
f f
              (6) 
along with the narrowlane phase measurement       
 1 1 2 243
1 2
4 3
4 3
f f
f f
            (7) 
to form the 3p observation equations for each-receivers viewing p+1 satellites: 
P1212 0 1
12112 0 1 12 12
1 43 43 2 4343 0
P 0 0
4 3
XA
NA I I
A I I N


 
   
   



                                       
        (8) 
where A1 is the p-by-3 design matrix for the user coordinates vector δX, I is the p-by-p identical matrix; 
and the effects of ionospheric and tropospheric biases were eliminated in the model over short-baselines. 
Direct detection of faulty DD phase measurements is difficult due to the redundancy of the equation 
system as low as (p-3). However, we can always assume that the ambiguity parameters in the previous 
epoch has been resolved, and the fixed integers can be used as an prior “measurements” of the ambiguity 
parameters of the current epoch, that is, we have the additional observation equations (Chang et al., 2001) 
 11 1
22 21 1
0
0
N
Nk k k
N NI
N NI



 
                     
         (9) 
where k and k-1 represent the current and previous data epoch; Let 
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A I
L H BA I
IN
IN
N
N e
N



  
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











                                                  
                
  (10) 
the general formation of geometry-based linear observational equations is expressed as follows 
L=H X+B N+e       (11) 
  0E e = , 122 1 20 0
ˆ( ) 1
0 0
( ) 0 0
0 0
P
N k
Q
Cov e P Q
Q
 



 
       
  (12) 
where: 
2
0    is the unit-weight variance parameter. 
P-1   is the 5p-by-5p weight matrix giving the relative importance between all the observations. 
2
0 12PQ   is the p-by-p covariance matrix for the DD 12P  code measurements. 
2
0 Q       is the 2p-by-2p covariance matrix given for the DD phase 12 and 43  phase 
measurements. 
2
0 ( ) 1N kQ    is the 2p-by-2p covariance matrix of the ambiguity vector obtained in the (k-1) th epoch. 
Test Statistic and Threshold 
After we get the floating solutions from equation (11) and (12), LAMBDA method is adopted to get the 
integer ambiguity, and then use the integer ambiguity to improve the floating solutions. A standard 
procedure can be found in (de Jonge, Tiberius, & Teunissen, 1996; Teunissen, De Jonge, & Tiberius, 
1997). When we get the integer ambiguity of 12 and 43 ,  either of them can be used to estimate the 
position because our interest is not the accuracy but the ability of integrity monitoring. In this paper, 
43  is used as the inputs of measurement y. The corresponding residual vector is 
1ˆ [ ( ) ]T Tv y y I G G PG G P y                       (13) 
The sum of squares of weighted residuals (SSWR) is then obtained 
SSWR=vTPv       (14) 
if the observation noise vector is normal distribution,  
2 1
0~ (0, )e N P             (15) 
In the absence of any measurement fault, the RSS residuals follow a central chi-square distribution 2  of 
(p-3) degrees of freedom, that is, 
2
2
0
~ ( 3)
Tv Pv p         (16) 
where p is the total number of 43 measurements. 
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After that we can apply the following criterion to detect whether the system works properly based on 
hypothesis testing. As SSWR is constructed to be test statistic and the corresponding detection threshold 
variable is T, then 0H  is the null hypothesis (no fault) and 1H  is the alternative hypothesis (with fault 
satellites). Therefore, we have 
0
1
:       
:      
H SSWR T
H SSWR T

                                 (17) 
Thus if SSWR less than T, it is normal state; otherwise the fault is detected. The performance of this test 
can be characterized by PFA and PMD (Mark A. Sturza, 1988): 
FA 0
MD 1
P [  | ]
P [ | ]
SSWR T H
SSWR T H
 
                                (18) 
Horizontal Protection Level 
In addition to detection of the faults in the DD phase measurements through chi-square testing, the RAIM 
algorithm also includes determination of the horizontal protection level (HPL), which is an upper bound 
that a horizontal position error must not exceed with a given PFA and PMD. HPL is defined as a function 
of the visible satellites, user geometry, and expected error characteristics. Given the horizontal dilution of 
precision (HDOP) 
2 2
E NHDOP
 

                   (19) 
The HPL is given by 
H H HHPL k k HDOP              (20) 
where Hk  is the factor that reflect the probability of missed detection. 
There are four conditions which can happen as shown in Table 3 (Kalafus & Chin, 1988). In the next 
section, different experiment scenarios are carried out to obtain the real statistic information about the 
false alert and missed detection conditions. 
Table 3 Integrity Conditions 
 Test Statistic Exceeds 
Alarm Threshold? 
NO YES 
Position Error Exceeds 
Protection Level 
NO Normal Operation False Alert 
YES Missed Detection Detection 
 
The above process limits to traditional RAIM concept, which is called Fault Detection (FD) only. The 
goal of fault detection is to detect the presence of a positioning failure. An enhanced version of RAIM 
employed in some receivers or system is known as Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE). It uses a 
minimum of 6 satellites to not only detect a possible faulty satellite, but to exclude it from the navigation 
solution so the navigation function can continue without interruptions. FDE in RTK solutions is also 
possible, and the procedure is: 
 
Computer the residual parameter as test statistic using all the satellites from equation (14).If test statistic 
is less than the threshold, assume there is no fault, otherwise give a failure detection alarm. If a failure 
detected, repeat step (1) and (2) with deleting a satellite one by one. Once the subset test statistic is less 
than the threshold, the satellite deleted is flagged as the fault satellite and not be used in the next 
process(Parkinson & Axelrad, 1988). 
Experimental Analysis  
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The purpose of the experimental analysis is to verify the performance of the model and RAIM detection 
algorithm against the different levels of single failures on the L1 phase DD measurements.  
Generally, there are two types of failure as outlined by RTCA SC-159 GPS Integrity Working Group: 
slow ramp, e.g., satellite oscillator failure resulting in a slow code and carrier phase drift and step error, 
e.g., bad ephemeris upload, cycle slips.  
 
The numerical experiment examine several computation scenarios, to demonstrate delectability of the  
proposed algorithm for the above two types of measurement faults, based on processing a real baseline 
data set. Table 4 gives the data set used in the experimental studies and observation weight settings in the 
model, as well as the computation scenarios and the probability of false alert. 
Table 4 Description of data sets and settings in geometry-based models 
Data information 
Data source/Date www.cors.ngs.gov, 1 Jan 2007 
Data sets/format P474 and P478, RINEX 
Data length/total epochs 24 h, 5760 epochs 
Sample rates 15 seconds 
Baseline 21 km 
Cut-off angle  15 degrees 
Settings in the models (10) and (11)  
A priori variances for ∆φ12 and ∆φ43 (0.028m)2, (0.014m)2  
A priori variance for P12 (0.425m)2 
Computation Scenarios 
(I) No additional errors added to any measurements 
(II) 0.25 cycle drift error added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
(III)0.5 cycle drift error added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
(IV) 1 cycle drift error added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
(V) 2.5 cycle drift error  added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
(VI) A ramp error at 0.1m/epoch rate added to one of the rover L1 carrier phase  
(VII) A ramp error at 0.01m/epoch rate added to one of the rover L1 carrier phase  
(VIII) Remove the measurement to which the error was added in (I)-(VII) 
Probability of false alert= 3.3310-7/sample 
Probability of missed detection= 0.001 
 
Note: the error was added only to non-reference satellite. 
 
Figure 2 shows the position errors (a) and the visible satellite numbers (b) under the computation 
Scenario I, in which the all ambiguities were correctly resolved and fixed to integers. The large 
positioning error around the epoch 533 was due to poor geometry formed by only five visible satellites. 
Figure 3 plots the threshold line against the test statistics (a) and the corresponding horizontal errors in (b). 
The test statistics larger than the threshold indicates the presence of false alerts, 56 out of the total of 5760 
epochs. It also can be found that the horizontal errors become larger when there are only five satellites at 
least two epochs. Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 show that the test statistics plotted against the detection thresholds 
for the computation Scenario II, III, IV and V respectively. The numbers of missed detections in these 
four scenarios are 41, 22, 0 and 0 respectively. Not surprisingly, the larger the added drift errors, the more 
powerful of the detection function. In other words, large errors can detected more effectively due to their 
large influence on the test statistic.  
 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show that the test statistics plotted against the thresholds with the ramp error at a 
rate 0.01m/epoch and 0.1m/epoch respectively. The number of missed detection condition is 165 and 3 
respectively. The figure of ‘field sawtooth’ is because when the reference satellite changes, the ramp error 
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start over again. It is easy to see that the bigger ramp errors are more detectable. Figure 10 shows the 
horizontal protection level which can reflect the real horizontal error at most epochs with the probability 
of missed detection 0.001. Figure 11 (a) shows the position error after removing the fault satellite, the 
abnormal large error occurring on two places is due to the wrong ambiguity solution with rare satellite 
number; (b) shows the detection threshold and test statistics, the blank is due to the no redundancy. Table 
5 summarizes the overall probability of false alert and missed detection from these experiments. 
Specifically, the probability of false alert is obtained from the normal operation scenario while the 
probabilities of missed detection are obtained from other six scenarios with different magnitude added 
errors. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of position errors without any simulation errors (all the ambiguity integers are 
correct), and the visible satellite numbers  
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Figure 3. Illustration of detection thresholds and test statistics, and the horizontal errors in the case of no 
simulation errors 
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Figure 4. Illustration of detection thresholds and test statistics in the case where a 0.25 cycle drift error 
was added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
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 Figure 5. Illustration of detection thresholds and test statistics in the case where a 0.5 cycle drift error 
was added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
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Figure 6. Illustration of detection thresholds and test statistics in the case where a 1 cycle drift error was 
added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
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Figure 7. Illustration of detection thresholds and test statistics in the case where a 2.5 cycle drift error was 
added to one of the rover L1 carrier phases 
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Figure 8. Illustration of detection thresholds and test statistics in the case of ramp error at the 
0.01m/epoch rate added to one of the rover L1 carrier phase 
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Figure 9. Illustration of detection thresholds and test statistics in the case of ramp error at the 0.1m/epoch 
rate added to one of the rover L1 carrier phase 
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Figure 10. Illustration of Horizontal Protection Level 
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Figure 11. Illustration of position errors removing fault satellite and the corresponding detection threshold 
and test statistic 
Table 5. Overall Probability of False Alert and Missed Detection  
 Error added Missed Detection 
Probability 
False Alert 
Probability  
I 0 NAN 0.972% 
II 0.25 cycles 7.61% NAN 
III 0.5 cycles 0.387% NAN 
IV 1 cycles 0 NAN 
V 2.5 cycles 0 NAN 
VI a ramp error at a rate 0.01m/epoch 2.9% NAN 
VII a ramp error at a rate 0.1m/epoch 0.0527% NAN 
VIII 0 NAN 0.74% 
Conclusion 
Introducing integrity monitoring techniques into RTK solutions and applications is challenging because 
of complexity of integer ambiguity solutions and geometric collections between measurements. This 
paper attempts to consider the accuracy and integrity requirements, and test the performance of the basic 
RAIM statistics. The required positioning parameters of precision agriculture were outlined in this paper. 
The modified snapshot RAIM method is proposed allowing for use of measurements from two 
consecutive epochs to benefit the fault detections. Based on a 24 hours baseline data set and the reference 
J. Wang, Y.Feng 
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ambiguity and position solutions obtained and analysis with added artificial errors, it is clearly seen that 
drift errors of as small as 5 cm can be detected with 99.3 %. With the ramp error as slow as 0.1m/epoch, 
the probability of missed detection can be the higher than 99.9%. HPL is also given in this paper which is 
more precise than the traditional pseudorange RAIM algorithm. Based on this work, carrying out the 
experiment with real trial data is expected, and to reduce the false alert events with more visible satellites 
is still a challenge and of significance in the future. 
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